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CARLSBERG RESOURCES V. CAMBRIA
SA VINGS AND LOAN ASS'N:
LIMITED PARTNERS AND
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Should the limited partners of a limited partnership be considered in
determining whether there is diversity of citizenship for federal juris-
dictional purposes?' This was the issue at bar in Carlsberg Resources v.
Cambria Savings and Loan Ass'n.2
In this case, Carlsberg Resources Corporation, the general partner3
in a limited partnership, had brought suit against Cambria Savings and
Loan for alleged negligence in the disbursement of construction devel-
opment loans. 4 The district court dismissed the suit for want of juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). While Carlsberg was a citizen of
1. For cases and additional information on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction as
applied to other types of unincorporated associations see Thomas v. Board of Trustees,
195 U.S. 207 (1904) (governing board); Lewis v. Odell, 503 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1974)
(partnership); Bundy v. Penn Cent. Co., 455 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1972) (labor union);
Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1970) (partnership); Mason v.
American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964) (unincorporated joint stock associa-
tion). See also Kaplan, Suits Against Unincorporated Associations Under the Federal
Rules of CivilProcedure, 53 MICH. L. REV. 945 (1955); Schwartz, The Limited Partnership
Association-An Alternative to the Corporation for the Small Business with "Control"
Problems?, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 29 (1965); Note, Federal Procedure: Diversity Juris-
diction: Unincorporated Associations: United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 51
CORNELL L.Q. 827 (1966); Note, Federal Procedure-Diversity Jurisdiction Over a
Louisiana Partnership, 27 LA. L. REV. 348 (1967); Comment, Citizenship of Unincor-
porated Associations for Diversity Purposes, 50 VA. L. REV. 1135 (1964); Note, Diversity
Jurisdiction for Unincorporated Associations, 75 YALE L.J. 138 (1965); 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 162 (1965) (discussing Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964));
34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 793 (1965).
2. 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
3. A limited partnership is required to have at least one general partner and one
limited partner. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 1. This uniform act has been
adopted in every state, except Louisiana, and in the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands. The Oklahoma version of this section states, "A limited partnership is a partner-
ship formed by two (2) or more persons under the provisions of Section [143 of this Title],
and having as members one (1) or more general partners and one (1) or more limited
partners." OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, § 142 (1971).
4. 413 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
5. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
1
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California, thirty-eight of the limited partners were citizens of Pennsylva-
nia where the suit was brought. Cambria Savings and Loan was alleged
to be a citizen of Pennsylvania, and the district court assumed, for the
purposes of the case, that Cambria Savings and Loan was a Pennsylvania
corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The
district court dismissed the action discussing the lack of an affirmative
allegation of diversity of citizenship and the identity of citizenship
between the defendant and thirty-eight limited partners of Carlsberg.6
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the lower court's
decision, held that the limited partners should be considered in determin-
ing whether diversity of citizenship existed.7
In discussing the Carlsberg case, this article will first review the
bases of both the majority and dissenting opinions. Next, the real party in
interest rule and the traditional treatment of unincorporated associations
with respect to diversity jurisdiction will be considered. Finally, this
article will present an analysis of the majority's opinion, and suggest two
possible alternative approaches.
II. THE BASES OF THE MAJORITY'S HOLDING AND
THE DISSENTING OPINION
In affirming the lower court's decision, the majority opinion stated:
When the rule of complete diversity is read in conjunction
with the principle that the citizenship of a partnership depends
and is between-(l) citizens of different States .... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). The
citizenship of a corporate general partner would be determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
(1970), which states, "For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a
corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and
of the State where it has its principal place of business .... "
It should be remembered that the judicial power of federal courts is a limited power.
Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971); Gammons v. Domestic Loans, Inc.,
423 F. Supp. 819 (M.D.N.C. 1976). Federal courts begin with the presumption that they
lack jurisdiction. Turner v. Bank of N. America, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 8 (1799); Clark v.
Wright & Lopez, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). To obtain jurisdiction, the
facts which disclose the existence of jurisdiction must be affirmatively alleged in the
pleadings. Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382 (1798); Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1970). If jurisdiction is challenged, the party claiming
jurisdiction has the burden of showing that jurisdiction exists. McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974).
6. 413 F. Supp. at 881-84. See Weinfeld v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 191 F.
Supp. 750 (D. Mass. 1961) (plaintiffs were citizens of Massachusetts; nine general partners
and seven limited partners were also citizens of Massachusetts). But see Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966) (identity of citizenship between limited
partners and opposing party did not defeat diversity jurisdiction.); C.P. Robinson
Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Housing Partnerships, 375 F. Supp. 446 (M.D.N.C.
1974) (same); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (same).
7. 554 F.2d at 1259.
2
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upon that of its members, it becomes clear that diversity juris-
diction may not obtain here, unless all of the members of the
plaintiff partnerhsip are of distinct citizenship from all of the
defendants. Since such diversity in citizenship is lacking, the
district court properly dismissed the complaint for want of
jurisdiction. 8
As indicated by the above statement, the court based its holding on
two principles. First, for diversity jurisdiction to exist in the federal
courts, there must be complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all
defendants. 9 Second, the citizenship of a partnership or unincorporated
association depends upon the citizenship of its members.
The former principle was first enunciated in the landmark case of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss.10 In Strawbridge several of the plaintiffs and all
of the defendants, with the exception of Curtiss, were citizens of Mas-
sachusetts. The United States Supreme Court held that, in a case based
upon diversity jurisdiction, all parties on one side of the action must be of
diverse citizenship from all parties on the other side.
The latter principle is derived from the past treatment of unincor-
porated associations. The circuit court first examined Great Southern
Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones," which involved a limited partnership
association 2 suing in federal court under diversity of citizenship. The
United States Supreme Court held that the citizenship of the association
was "the citizenship of the several persons composing such associa-
tion.' 3 The Third Circuit believed that Great Southern required the
citizenship of each partner to be considered regardless of the nature of the
association. Chapman v. Barney14 was considered next. Chapman in-
volved a joint stock company 15 authorized by the laws of New York to
8. Id.
9. See note 10 infra and accompanying text. Congress is empowered to make
exceptions to the requirement of complete diversity, however. For example, only minimal
diversity is required in interpleader actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970). State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
10. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267 (1806). For a general discussion of Strawbridge, see
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, § 3605
(1975).
11. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
12. For further information on limited partnership associations, see Schwartz, The
Limited Partnership Association- An Alternative to the Corporation for the Small Busi-
ness with "Control"Problems? 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 29 (1965); 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1155
(1976).
13. 177 U.S. at 456.
14. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
15. A joint stock company is a form of business organization created by an agreement
among its members. This agreement, much like a corporate charter, contains such items as
the name, duration of existence, capitalization, and internal organization of the company.
There are also freely transferable shares of ownership. However, unlike a corporation, the
[Vol. 13:304
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sue in the name of its president. Here too, the Supreme Court required
the citizenship of each member to be counted for diversity purposes. The
Third Circuit perceived in Chapman a refusal by the Supreme Court to
differentiate between classes of members of an association in determin-
ing diversity of citizenship. Finally, the court examined United Steelwor-
kers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc. 16 and determined that Bouligny reaffirmed
the Great Southern and Chapman holdings that each member of an
unincorporated association must be considered for jurisdictional pur-
poses. Also, the Third Circuit interpreted Bouligny as requiring
Congress, not the courts, to make any alterations in the jurisdictional
treatment of unincorporated associations.
In support of its position counting limited partners in determining
diversity jurisdiction, the court enunciated two policy reasons: federal-
ism and judicial economy. The court thought that the exercise of diversi-
ty jurisdiction interfered with the autonomy of the states, thus defeating
the division of power between state governments and the federal govern-
ment. It also feared the federal courts would become swamped with
diversity cases and thus be prevented from exercising jurisdiction effec-
tively in other areas.
Once the court had established these bases for its decision, it
examined the position adopted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
as expressed in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. 17 Colonial Realty
had held that:
[I]dentity of citizenship between the plaintiff and a limited
partner was not fatal because under the applicable New York
statute a limited partner 'is not a proper party to proceedings by
or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a
limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership.' 8
The court criticized Colonial Realty for determining diversity of
citizenship by reference to the capacity of a limited partner to sue.
Looking to past cases, 19 the court concluded that diversity of citizenship
should not be viewed in light of the capacity to sue rule. Also, the Third
Circuit thought Colonial Realty's view created a conflict between Rule
members do not have limited liability to creditors, unless it is specifically contracted with
the creditors that liability be limited to company property. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG,
LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 34, at 178-81 (1968).
16. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
17. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966). See generally cases cited in note 6 supra.
18. Id. at 183-84.
19. Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908); Lehigh Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895); McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied sub. nom. Fritzinger v. Weist, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
1977]
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17(b)2° and Rule 8221 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court
believed that using the capacity to sue, as provided for in Rule 17(b),
resulted in expanding the jurisdiction of the United States district courts
in violation of Rule 82.
The dissenting judge in Carlsberg disagreed with the majority's
opinion in several areas. First, the dissent considered a limited partner-
ship to be a unique form of business which should not be grouped with
general partnerships. He also believed that the majority was putting the
cart before the horse by determining the presence or absence of diversity
before considering the capacity to sue. The dissent wondered how the
majority "knows whose citizenship to count without first determining
who the parties are. "22 Finally, the dissent stated that the cases the
majority relied on were inapposite to limited partnerships because those
cases did not involve association with the unique qualities of a limited
partnership.
III. THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST RULE AND THE PAST
TREATMENT OF UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
The general rule is that only a real party in interst may bring a suit in
federal court.2 The real party in interest rule originated in Wormely v.
Wormely24 and it has been incorporated in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure by Rule 17(a).1 It has been said that "Federal Rule 17(a)
states that every action shall be brought in the name of the real party in
interest.' '26
20. The relevant part of FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) states:
The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity,
to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. The capacity of a
corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was
organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the
law of the state in which the district court is held ....
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 states:
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts or the venue of actions therein. An admiralty or maritime
claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) shall not be treated as a civil action for the
purposes of Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 1391-93.
22. 554 F.2d at 1263 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
23. Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 168 U.S. 445 (1897).
24. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 421 (1823). In holding that it is the real party in interest who is
to be considered, the Supreme Court stated:
This court will not suffer its jurisdiction to be ousted by the mere joinder or non-joinder of formal parties; but will rather proceed without them, and decide upon
the merits of the case between the parties, who have the real interests before it,
whenever it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others.
Id. at 451.
25. The relevant part of FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) states: "Every action shall be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party in interest."
26. Wright v. Schebler Co., 37 F.R.D. 319 (S.D. Iowa 1965).
5
Sublett: Carlsberg Resources v. Cambria Savings and Loan Ass'n: Limited Pa
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
1977] CARLSBERG RESOURCES
The purpose of the real party in interest rule27 is to enable the
defendant to present his defenses against the proper persons, to avoid
subsequent suits, and to proceed to finality of judgment. 28 To accomplish
these purposes, the real party in interest is defined as the person who, by
substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.29 As a result, the
party in whose name the suit is brought is not necessarily the party who
ultimately benefits from the litigation, because the beneficiary of the suit
may not have the substantive right sought to be enforced. 30 Because it is
the real party in interest who must bring the suit in federal court, it is that
party's citizenship which is considered in determining whether there is
diversity of citizenship for jurisdictional purposes.31 This rule has been
held to include representatives, 32 such as guardians, 33 administrators34
and trustees.35
The Third Circuit, however, has departed from the general real
party in interest rule and has considered only the citizenship of the party
who has the capacity to sue in determining diversity of citizenship. 36 This
rule was limited to the extent that a person who was appointed or joined
specifically to create diversity will not be considered for diversity pur-
poses. 37 In this situation, 28 U.S.C. § 135938 mandates that the court
look behind the form to the substance of the arrangement to prevent the
manufacture of jurisdiction.39
27. There has been much criticism of the real party in interest rule. See, e.g.,
Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for Its Abolition, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 926
(1957); Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(a): Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51
MINN. L. REv. 675 (1967).
28. Rackley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.R.D. 516, 517 (E.D.S.C. 1964). Accord,
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973).
29. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Perry, 322 F.2d 589(10th Cir. 1963); Gagliano v.
Bernsen, 243 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1957); Rock Drilling Laborer's Local 17 v. Mason &
Hanger Co., 217 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1954).
30. See, e.g., White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 387 F.
Supp. 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Armour Pharmaceutical Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 60 F.R.D. 592
(N.D. II. 1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Mottola, 302 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
31. See, e.g., Rice v. Houston, 80 U.S. 66 (1871); Hann v. City of Clinton, 131 F.2d
978 (10th Cir. 1942); Anderson v. Cecil, 407 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Cole v.
Continental Oil Co., 240 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
32. New Orleans v. Gaines' Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595 (1891).
33. Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903).
34. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
35. County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961).
36. Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955). The Third Circuit has disapproved
Fallat, "to the extent that it indicates approval of 'manufacture' diversity." McSparran v.
Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968).
37. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968); Fahmer v. Gentzsch, 355 F.
Supp. 349 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) states: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a
civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or
collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."
39. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
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The capacity to sue rule used by the Third Circuit serves the same
purpose as the real party in interest rule. Capacity to sue is a further
requirement to bring an action in federal court.40 Thus, although a party
may have the substantive right to be enforced, he will be prevented from
bringing suit in federal court unless he also has the capacity to sue. By
these requirements, the defendant is protected from subsequent suits, is
able to raise his defenses against the only party who can sue him, and
receives a final judgment.
While the general rule has been to look to the citizenship of the real
party in interest to determine diversity of citizenship, all the members of
an unincorporated association traditionally have been considered in de-
termining whether diversity of citizenship exists.41 This is well illustrated
by Chapman, Great Southern, and Bouligny. The Supreme Court held
in these cases that the citizenship of all of the members of an unincor-
porated association should be considered in determining diversity.42
These cases put forth several distinct reasons for considering the citizen-
ship of the general membership of the unincorporated association for
diversity purposes.
First, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to recognize unincor-
porated associations as entities. In Chapman, which involved a joint
stock company, the Court stated, "I[A]lthough it may be authorized by
the laws of the State of New York to bring suit in the name of its
president, that fact cannot give the company power, by that name, to sue
in Federal Court." '43 Second, because the Supreme Court has been
unwilling to consider unincorporated associations as entities, it has also
been unwilling to extend the doctrine of corporate citizenship to unincor-
porated associations. 44 In Great Southern the Court stated:
That a limited partnership association created under the Penn-
sylvania statute may be described as a 'quasi-corporation,'
40. Rule 17(b), FED. R. Civ. P. See note 20 supra for the text thereof.
41. See, e.g., Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904); Lewis v. Odell, 503
F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1974) (partnership); Bundy v. Penn Cent. Co., 455 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.
1972) (labor union); Brocki v. American Express Co., 279 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1960) (joint
stock company). But see Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964)
(unincorporated joint stock association).
42. See notes 11, 14 and 16 supra and accompanying text.
43. 129 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added). See United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny,
Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 153 (1965) (Chapman v. Barney followed).
44. In dealing with corporations, the United States Supreme Court first held that
corporations were not citizens and that each of its members was to be considered for
diversity purposes. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). In
Deveaux, the Court stated, "The court feels itself authorized by the case in 12 Mod., (on a
question of jurisdiction), to look to the character of the individuals who compose the
corporation. . . ." Id. at 91-92. Subsequently, however, the Court decided to allow
[Vol. 13:304
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having some of the characteristics of a corporation, or as a 'new
artificial person,' is not a sufficient reason for regarding it as a
corporation within the jurisdictional rule heretofore adverted to.
That rule must not be extended. We are unwilling to extend it
so as to embrace partnership associations. 45
Third, in Bouligny the Supreme Court found a problem in determining
the location of the citizenship of the association. The Court stated that it
would be required to develop a new test in order to ascertain the
citizenship of the labor union. 46 Finally the Court in Bouligny opined that
it was the province of Congress, not the courts, to change the juris-
dictional treatment of unincorporated associations. 47
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY'S HOLDING AND
Two POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
The traditional approach toward unincorporated associations was
taken by the majority in Carlsberg. As stated previously,48 the majority
in Carlsberg relied on Great Southern, Chapman, and Bouligny to
support its holding that limited partners should be counted in determining
whether diversity of citizenship exists. However, the traditional treat-
ment of unincorporated associations may not be appropriate for modern
limited partnerships.
The Carlsberg court recognized one of the problems with using
Great Southern as authority and applying the traditional treatment of
unincorporated associations to limited partnerships. In discussing Great
Southern, the Carlsberg majority stated, "That case did not involve a
factual matrix in which there were partners of differing classes, since all
of the partners were of a 'limited' status. "49 The association involved in
corporations to be considered citizens of the state in which they were incorporated. It
stated:
We confess our inability to reconcile these qualities of a corporation-residence,
habitancy, and individuality, with the doctrine that a corporation aggregate
cannot be a citizen for the purposes of a suit in the courts of the United States,
unless in consequence of a residence of all the corporators being of the State in
which the suit is brought. When the corporation exercises its powers in the State
which chartered it, that is its residence, and such an averment is sufficient to give
the circuit courts jurisdiction.
Louisville R.R. v. Leston, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497,559 (1844). For discussion of the doctrine
of corporate citizenship see Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118 (1882); Ohio & M.
R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286 (1861).
45. 177 U.S. at 457. Accord, United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S.
145 (1965).
46. 382 U.S. at 152.
47. Id. at 153.
48. See notes 11, 14, and 16 supra and accompanying text.
49. 554 F.2d at 1258.
1977]
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Great Southern was a limited partnership association, 50 organized under
the Pennsylvania Statutes of 1874.51 A lmited partnership association
differs in several respects from the modern limited partnership. As the
court pointed out, there was only one class of partners involved in Great
Southern, while in a modern limited partnership there are two classes-
general partners and limited partners.52 Also, the management in Great
Southern was elected from the general membership of the association,
while in the modem limited partnership the limited partners may not
participate in the management, except to a very minimal extent. 53 Final-
ly, the members of the association in Great Southern all had liability
limited to the amount they had contributed, while in the modern limited
partnership the general partners have unlimited liability.
54
A second problem with the Carlsberg court's reliance upon Great
Southern is that in Great Southern the parties contended that a limited
partnership association was an entity. In Carlsberg, the dissent points
out, there was no issue of entity involved.55 The majority also recognized
that there was no "entity" issue in Carlsberg. 56 However, the majority
used Chapman 7 which rejected the entity argument, as support for the
proposition that the Supreme Court has refused to recognize different
classes in counting membership of unincorporated associations. The
dissent in Carlsberg attacked the majority's interpretation of the Chap-
man case. After quoting from Chapman,58 the dissent stated, "Thus, the
Court did not consider an argument that because state law gave only the
president the capacity to sue, only the president's citizenship should
50. See materials cited in note 12 supra for further information on limited partnership
associations.
51. 1874 PA. LAWS No. 153, p. 271 (repealed).
52. Compare 1874 PA. LAWS No. 153, p. 27 1 (repealed) with 59 PA. CONS. STAT. § 511
(1975) and UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 1.
53. Compare 1874 PA. LAWS No. 153, p. 271 (repealed) with PA. CONS. STAT. §§
521, 524 (1975) and UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 7, 10.
54. Compare 1874 PA. LAWS No. 153, p. 271 (repealed) with 59 PA. CONS. STAT. §
523 (1975) and UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9.
55. 544 F.2d at 1263 n.5.
56. "[W]e recognize that the three leading Supreme Court cases in this area, which
have been discussed above, do not squarely address the exact question posed here-in
effect, whether partners of divergent status may be treated differently for purposes of an
evaluation regarding diversity of citizenship." Id. at 1259.
57. 129 U.S. 677 (1889). There has been criticism of the rule in Chapman. See Mason
v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1964); American Fed'n of Musicians v.
Stein, 213 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1954); Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d
Cir. 1947). See generally Unincorporated Associations: Diversity Jurisdiction and the ALI
Proposals, 1965 DUKE L.J. 329; Unions as Judicial Persons, 66 YALE L.J. 712 (1957).
58. The dissent quoted the following passage from Chapman:
On looking into the record we find no satisfactory showing as to the citizen-
ship of the plaintiff. The allegation of the amended petition is, that the United
States Express Company is a joint stock company organized under a law of the
[Vol. 13:304
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matter. The rights and liabilities of the members were not an issue." 59
The dissent thought the thrust of Chapman rejected any consideration of
the joint stock company as an entity and required only that the general
membership be counted for diversity purposes.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Chapman in its decision in the
Bouligny case. In Bouligny the Court refused to define a labor union as
an entity. 6° The Carlsberg majority used this holding in support of its
argument that limited partners should be counted for diversity purposes,
although it recognized that the entity concept was not an issue. Also, the
majority employed a second argument from Bouligny: that it is the
province of Congress, not the courts, to change the jurisdictional treat-
ment of unincorporated associations. 61 This argument is not necessarily
valid; it was the Supreme Court which originated the doctrine of corpo-
rate citizenship in Louisville R.R. v. Leston,62 decided the treatment of
unincorporated associations in Chapman, and granted a jural personality
to a sociedad en comandita in Puerto Rico v. Russell.63 Although
Congress has specifically mentioned corporations in 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c), 4 this was to eliminate the specific problem of local corporations
incorporated in a foreign state, rather than to make corporations the only
artificial persons capable of having citizenship, independent of member-
ship, for purposes of diversity.65
The court in Carlsberg also argued that limited partners should be
State of New York, and is a citizen of that State. But the express company cannot
be a citizen of New York, within the meaning of the statutes regulating juris-
diction, unless it be a corporation. The allegation that the company was organized
under the laws of New York is not an allegation that it is a corporation. In fact,
the allegation is, that the company is not a corporation, but a joint-stock
company-that is, a mere partnership. And, although it may be authorized by the
laws of the State of New York to bring suit in the name of its president, that fact
cannot give the company power, by that name, to sue in a Federal court.
554 F.2d at 1264 n.7 (quoting from Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889)) (final
emphasis added).
59. 554 F.2d at 1264 n.7.
60. 382 U.S. 150-51.
61. Id. at 153.
62. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). See note 44 supra.
63. 288 U.S. 476 (1933). See also Luce & Co. v. Altementos Borinquefios, S.A., 276
F. Supp. 94 (D. Puerto Rico 1967) (Puerto Rico v. Russell followed).
64. The pertinent part of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970) states: "For the purposes of this
section and section 1441 of this title, a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State
by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business .... "
65. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3099, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3099, 3101 stated:
This fiction of stamping a corporation a citizen of the State of its incorporation
has given rise to the evil whereby a local institution, engaged in a local business
and in many cases locally owned, is enabled to bring its litigation into the Federal
courts simply because it has obtained a corporate charter from another State.
1977]
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counted on grounds of both federalism and judicial economy. The dissent
agreed with the majority, that there were concerns for federalism and
judicial economy, but went on to state, "Nonetheless, [the] federal
courts still have jurisdiction in diversity cases, and whatever the effect on
our docket, I see no responsible alternative but to apply diversity stan-
dards in this case." 66 Diversity jurisdiction was adopted in the Constitu-
tion67 and, as such, it is a part of the federal system.
Although diversity jurisdiction is part of the Constitution, it has
been and still is a very controversial part. At both the Constitutional
Convention and in many of the state conventions debating the ratification
of the Constitution, there was much opposition to including the section
on diversity jurisdiction. 68 The argument over diversity jurisdiction
continues at present. 69
66. 554 F.2d at 1263.
67. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
68. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIS-
DICTION § 3601 (1975); Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 23 (1948); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 81 (1923).
69. There are generally three positions on the merits of the question. The first position
is to maintain diversity jurisdiction as it presently exists, or even to expand it somewhat.
The second position, propounded by the American Law Institute (ALI), is to retain
diversity jurisdiction but to limit its scope. Finally, there are those who wish to eliminate
diversity jurisdiction altogether.
Those who support the retention of diversity jurisdiction put forth several arguments.
The first is that access to the federal courts via diversity jurisdiction is a federal right.
State citizens in the United States are citizens of both the particular state and of the
United States, so that the right to litigate in a federal court, when the suit is between
citizens of different states, is an attribute of national citizenship. Also, when a citizen goes
beyond the borders of his own state, diversity jurisdiction offers a feeling of security: if a
cause of action should accrue while the person travels outside his home state, he knows
that there will be an independent system of national courts to try his case.
Secondly, diversity jurisdiction may help to promote commerce among the states.
Those desiring the retention of diversity jurisdiction argue that although a state court case
may eventually reach the United States Supreme Court, this does not provide enough
security for businessmen. Local bias may not be apparent on appellate review, and the
knowledge that the case may reach the Supreme Court is not sufficiently comforting to
investors.
The third argument propounded by the supporters of diversity jurisdiction deals with
the courts. There is a belief that in many instances federal procedures and federal judges
are better than state procedures and judges. Also, diversity serves an educational func-
tion. It allows for a greater exchange of ideas between the members of the bars of both the
federal and the state courts. For further explication of these rationales, see Frank, For
Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963); Marbury, Why Should We
Limit Federal Diversity Jurisdiction?, 46 A.B.A.J. 379 (1960); Moore & Weckstein,
Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present and Future, 43 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1964); Parker, Dual
Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 407, 408-13 (1956); Wright, The
Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317 (1967).
The ALI also argues for the retention of diversity jurisdiction, but with a more limited
scope. ALI STUDY ON THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS, § 1302 (Official Draft 1965 and 1968). The main limitations on diversity juris-
11
Sublett: Carlsberg Resources v. Cambria Savings and Loan Ass'n: Limited Pa
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
1977] CARLSBERG RESOURCES
Many of the arguments which support the retention of diversity
jurisdiction for individuals and corporations apply as well to limited
partnerships.7' Some consider the right of citizens of different states to
litigate in federal court to be an attribute of national citizenship. When an
individual sues or is sued by a limited partnership, the individual may be
denied his right to litigate in federal court simply because one of the
limited partners is a citizen of the same state as is the individual.
A second argument for the retention of diversity jurisdiction, deal-
ing with the promotion of commerce, is more directly connected with
limited partnerships, because they are generally involved in some
diction would come under the ALI's proposed § 1302(a), (b), and (c). Section 1302(a)
would prevent a plaintiff from invoking diversity jurisdiction if the plaintiff brings suit in
his home state. The ALI believes that there is no need for a plaintiff suing in his home
state to invoke diversity jurisdiction, because the plaintiff has some control over how the
laws of his own state are administered.
Section 1302(b) deals with corporations and unincorporated associations which have
maintained a local establishment within a state for two or more years. The ALI argues that
these corporations and unincorporated associations should, in fairness, be subject to the
state's jurisdiction if they have been competing in that state for two or more years and
meet the definition of "local establishment" as set forth in § 1302(b).
The third limitation would come under § 1302(c), which deals with people living in one
state but having their principal place of business or employment in another state. The ALI
would deny this type of commuter the right to invoke diversity jurisdiction; first, because
local prejudice is unlikely, and second, because the ALI does not believe that the mere
choice of place of employment presents a strong enough case for federal interference with
state autonomy. For a more detailed discussion of proposed § 1302(a), (b), and (c), see
ALT STUDY ON THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, at
132-42 (Official Draft 1965 and 1968).
Those arguing for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction think that local bias does not
present a serious problem anymore. The individual's ties with his state have been
weakened by the mobility of our society, and business will expand beyond state borders
without concern for the availability of a federal forum. Also, ideas will continue to flow
between the state and federal courts through other means, such as periodicals and the
ALT.
Those wishing to abolish diversity jurisdiction contend that the state courts were
originally meant to handle the ordinary controversies which arise every day, while the
federal courts were meant to spend most of their time concentrating on questions arising
under the Constitution and federal statutes. Finally, those wishing to abolish diversity
jurisdiction argue that the work load of the federal courts is too great to handle the cases
arising under diversity jurisdiction. One commentator even feels that increasing the
number of federal judges would not help, since this would just attract more cases.
Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction-An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347, 351
(1976). For further elaboration of the arguments against the retention of diversity juris-
diction, see Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. REv. 356 (1933-
1934); Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction-An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347
(1976); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
4-49 (1968); Frankfurte, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520-30 (1928); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234-40 (1948).
70. See Comment, Unincorporated Associations: Diversity Jurisdiction and the ALI
Proposal, 1965 DUKE L.J. 329; Comment, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction--Citizenship for
Unincorporated Associations, 19 VAND. L. REV. 984 (1966).
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commercial activity. The knowledge that an independent system of
courts exists may help to promote commerce. Whether or not local
prejudice actually exists is not the question, according to Chief Justice
Taft; rather, the critical question is "whether it is thought to be so by
those who are considering the wisdom of investing their capital in states
where that capital is needed for promotion of enterprises and industrial
and commercial progress."71
Finally, as it stands now, limited partnerships are in many instances
deprived of the advantage of the arguably superior federal judges and
procedures. It happens, though, that through the manipulation of that
same federal procedure, limited partnerships can create diversity of
citizenship by the use of the class action device. 72 It would seem prefer-
able to extend to limited partnerships the right to avail themselves of
diversity jurisdiction, rather than to allow the abuse of the "superior"
procedures.
Although the controversy over diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is
far from settled, that type of jurisdiction is, at the present time, part of the
federal system. As a part of the federal system, diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction should be exercised if it exists, and not avoided as was done
in the Carlsberg case. It should be noted that neither the majority nor the
dissent disagreed as to the merits of the diversity jurisdiction controver-
sy; they only disagreed as to whether the merits of that controversy
should resolve the question actually before the court.73
V. CAPAcrrY TO SUE
In criticizing Colonial Realty, the majority in Carlsberg was
troubled by the Second Circuit's use of the capacity to sue rule as the test
for diversity of citizenship, even though this test has also been used by
the Third Circuit.74 The majority cited McSparran v. Weist 75 for the
proposition that citizenship, for diversity purposes, is not to be viewed
through capacity to sue. The court quoted from McSparran:
We are not here concerned. . . with the capacity to sue under
Rule 17, nor with the question whether the fiduciary is the real
party in interest. Our problem is whether for purposes of diver-
sity jurisdiction we should look to the citizenship of the repre-
71. Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Justice in the Federal
Courts, 47 ABA REP. 250, 259 (1922).
72. See note 87 infra.
73. 554 F.2d at 1257, 1263.
74. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
75. 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968). See also note 19 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13:304
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sentative, here the guardian of the estate of a minor, or to the
person on whose behalf he acts.
76
The reason the McSparran case did not use the capacity to sue rule
was that it was concerned about an attempt to manufacture diversity
jurisdiction. After citing several cases using the capacity to sue rule, the
McSparran court went on to state that those cases did not "[d]ecide the
problem now before us-the effect of the artificial creation or 'manufac-
ture' of diversity." '77 The McSparran case, rather than refusing to use
capacity to sue for determining the existence of diversity of citizenship,
limited the use of that test to cases where there is no attempt to manufac-
ture diversity.
The court in Carlsberg believed Colonial Realty's use of Rule
17(b)71 created a conflict with Rule 82.79 The majority stated: "Assum-
ing that Colonial Realty was relying, at least in part, on Rule 17 for
authority to look to state law to resolve the jurisdictional matter before
the court, we believe that such reference may run afoul of the mandate of
Rule 82.' '80 The court's main concern was that state law8' would deter-
mine the presence or absence of federal jurisdiction. Rule 82 refers only
to the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,82 which in the
Carlsberg case is derived from diversity of citizenship. Rule 17(b) does
not expand or limit federal jurisdiction, but merely defines the test to be
used in determining whether or not there is jurisdiction. Using Rule 17(b)
only to define the test for jurisdictional purposes, "would not seem to be
prohibited.' '83
In other situations, such as those involving guardians 84 and adminis-
trators,8 5 it is state law which is used to determine whether diversity of
citizenship exists. While these cases involving guardians and adminis-
76. 554 F.2d at 1260 n.24.
77. 402 F.2d at 870.
78. See note 20 supra.
79. See note 21 supra.
80. 554 F.2d at 1261.
81. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) stated: "Except in matters governed by
the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State." Id. at 78. This led to some confusion about what rules of procedure to
follow in federal court when using state law. The Court clarified this confusion when it
noted "the incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins constitutes
the appropriate test of the validity and therefore the applicability of the Federal Rule[s] of
Civil Procedure." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965). So, although state
substantive law may be controlling in the case, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
followed with regard to all procedural aspects.
82. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
83. Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
84. Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903).
85. Mecon v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
1977]
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trators 86 were using the real party in interest test, it is still state substan-
tive law which determines whether federal jurisdiction exists.
As can be seen, there is a strong tradition for counting all members
of an unincorporated association in determining the existence of diversity
of citizenship.8 7 Because of the nature of limited partnerships, 8 how-
ever, it would seem that one of two alternative treatments would be more
appropriate in determining the presence of diversity where limited part-
nerships are involved. The first alternative would be to grant limited
partnerships a jural personality and treat them like corporations for
diversity purposes. 89 The second alternative would be to consider only
the general partners as real parties in interest when determining whether
the parties are, in fact, diverse.
The United States Supreme Court has already laid the foundation for
considering limited partnerships as jural persons in Puerto Rico v. Rus-
sell.' Russell involved a sociedad en comandita. The sociedad en
comandita is a form of civil law partnership from which the modern
limited partnership is derived. 91 Thus, although the sociedad en comandi-
ta may have been an "exotic creation of the civil law," 92 its relative, the
limited partnership, has become one of our modem business associations
by statute.93 Because of its heritage, the modern limited partnership has
many traits in common with the sociedad en comandita.94 It would seem
86. See notes 33 and 34 supra and accompanying text.
87. The class action is available to unincorporated association. See, Calagaz v.
Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 251-53 (5th Cir. 1962). If a class action is used by a limited
partnership not all limited partners need be counted. For further discussion of unincor-
porated associations and the class action devise, see Comment, Unincorporated Associa-
tions: Diversity Jurisdiction and the ALI Proposal, 1965 DUKE L.J. 329, 331-32.
88. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
91. "This system of partnership was at an early day adopted in continental Europe,
and became part of the modem civil law ... " Fifth Ave. Bank v. Colgate, 120 N.Y.
381, 24 N.E. 799, 802 (1890).
92. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965).
93. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, §§ 141-171 (1971).
94. In Puerto Rico v. Russell, 288 U.S. 476 (1933), the Supreme Court listed several
traits which it thought gave the sociedad en comandita a jural personality. Several are
offered for comparison with the Pennsylvania Statute and Uniform Limited Partnership
Act. Compare "Its members are not thought to have sufficient personal interest in a suit
brought against the entity to entitle them to intervene as parties defendant," 288 U.S. at
481, with 59 PA. CONS. STAT. § 545 (1975) and UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 26
(contributor not proper party to suit unless he is a general partner). Compare "It is created
by articles of association filed as public records," 288 U.S. at 481, with 59 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 512(l)(b) (1975) and UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 2(l)(b) (requiring
certificate to be recorded). Compare "Where the articles so provide, the sociedad
endures for a period prescribed by law, regardless of the death or withdrawal of individual
members," 288 U.S. at 481 with 59 PA. CONS. STAT. § 512(l)(A) V, X, XIII (1975) and
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 2(1)(a) V, X, XIII; 20 (period of partnership's
[Vol. 13:304
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therefore, if consistency is an object of our legal system, that the limited
partnership should be treated in the same manner as the sociedad en
comandita. But, in light of the Supreme Court's past treatment of
unincorporated associations 95 and its reluctance 96 to extend the corporate
citizenship doctrine, it is unlikely that the limited partnership will obtain
a jural personality.
A more profitable argument might be made under the real party in
interest rule.97 As stated before, it is only the real party in interest whose
citizenship is determinative of diversity, 98 and the real party in interest is
the person with the substantive right to be enforced, 99 not necessarily the
person who benefits from the litigation. 100 Taking these rules into con-
sideration, there are several factors which militate against limited part-
ners being considered as the real parties in interest.
The first factor is the purpose for which limited partnerships were
developed. In Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn 10 1 the purpose of
limited partnerships was stated:
[I]t appears that this general purpose is not to assist creditors,
but to enable persons to invest their money in partnerships and
share in the profits without being liable for more than the
amount they have contributed. The reason for this is to encour-
age investing by parties having capital but who will not partici-
pate in the detailed operation of the partnership. 102
duration). Compare "Powers of management may be vested in managers designated by
the articles from among the members whose participation is unlimited, and they alone may
perform acts legally binding on the sociedad,'" 288 U.S. at 481 with 59 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
512(1)(a) IV, 523, 524 (1975) and UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 2(1)(a) IV
(certificate must designate whether general or limited partner), 9, 10 (rights of general and
limited partners). Compare "Its members are not primarily liable for its acts and debts
. . ." 288 U.S. at 481, with 59 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 521, 545 (1975) and UNIFORM
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 7, 26 (limited liability of limited partners). Compare "[Ilts
creditors are preferred with respect to its assets and property over the creditors of the
individual members, although the latter may reach the interests of the individual members
in the common capital." 288 U.S. at 481, with 59 PA. CONS. STAT. § 536 (1975) and
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 22, 23(l)(a) (creditors of partnership preferred
over individual creditors).
95. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 46 and 47 supra and accompanying text.
97. In Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Rlty. Trust v. Pendley, 405 F. Supp. 593 (N.D.
Ga. 1975), and Jim Walters Investors v. Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425 (N.D.
Ga. 1975), similar arguments were put forth. Both of these cases involved business trusts.
It was argued in these cases that only the trustees, and not the beneficial holders of the
shares of the trust, were the real parties in interest. Both Chase Manhattan and Jim
Walters rejected this argument.
98. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
99. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
100. see note 30 supra and accompanying text.
101. 168 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1964).
102. Id. at 764.
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Thus the purpose of limited partnerships is to allow persons to invest, but
to take only limited responsibility in connection with the investment.
A second factor to be considered is that limited partners have no
rights in the partnership assets.10 3 Since the limited partners have no such
rights, there is very little on which to base a substantive cause of action.
Having the right to enforce the substantive cause of action is one of the
prime determinants of a real party in interest."°
The third, and perhaps most important factor to be considered is that
limited partners do not have the ability to sue on behalf of the partner-
ship. 105 In connection with the limited partners' inability to sue, the
dissent in Carlsberg stated, "Thus, the majority would have us take
cognizance, for diversity purposes, of persons who, under state law, are
clearly prohibited from taking part in a suit by or against the partnership.
This, to me, appeals neither to logic nor to common sense."' 106
The capacity to sue was one of the criteria used by the United States
Supreme Court in Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co. 107 in determining
who was the real party in interest. In Fitzsimmons the Supreme Court
adopted the view that, "[W]here an administrator is required to bring suit
under statute, . . . he is the real party in interest and his citizenship
rather than that of the beneficiary is determinative of federal juris-
diction. "108
Taking into consideration the purpose of the limited partnership, the
lack of personal interest in the partnership assets by the limited partners,
and the lack of ability by the limited partners to sue on behalf of the
partnership, it would seem unreasonable to consider the limited partners
as real parties in interest and to count them for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The overall motivating force behind the decision in Carlsberg
appears to be a concern about the nature of federal jurisdiction. The court
was afraid it would be expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
interfering with state autonomy, and allowing state law to determine the
103. See, e.g., Alley v. Clark, 71 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1947); Lichtyger v. Fran-
chard Corp. 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
104. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
105. See 59 PA. CONS. STAT. § 545 (1975); UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 26.
See also Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1975);
Lieberman v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. 385 P.2d 53 (Wash. 1963).
106. 554 F.2d at 1265.
107. 284 U.S. 183 (1931). Accord, Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903).
108. 284 U.S. at 186.
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extent of federal jurisdiction if it did not count limited partners. How-
ever, diversity jurisdiction was provided for in the Constitution. Many of
the arguments which support the retention of diversity jurisdiction for
individuals and corporations apply equally as well to limited partner-
ships. Since diversity jurisdiction is a part of the federal system, albeit a
controversial part, it seems reasonable to count only general partners for
diversity purposes. This could be accomplished either by using the
foundation laid by the Supreme Court in Puerto Rico v. Russell or by
using the real party in interest test, which is employed in other diversity
situations.
Scott C. Sublett
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